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Abstract. We present a new approach for mutation 
analysis of Security Policies test cases. We propose a 
metamodel that provides a generic representation of 
security policies access control models and define a set 
of mutation operators at this generic level. We use 
Kermeta to build the metamodel and implement the 
mutation operators. We also illustrate our approach 
with two successful instantiation of this metamodel: we 
defined policies with RBAC and OrBAC and mutated 
these policies.  
1 Introduction 
Access control policies are a among the most 
important security mechanisms necessary to increase 
the confidence in a system. Verifying that the 
implementation does not contain flaws or security 
breaches is thus a critical task. Testing security policies 
is a possible approach to fulfill this objective that 
requires generating efficient test cases. One strategy to 
evaluate the efficiency of these test cases is to perform 
mutation analysis [1] which has proved its 
effectiveness in many fields in the past. 
The main idea behind mutation analysis is that a 
good set of test cases should be able to detect common 
faults that can occur in a program. When validating the 
efficiency of a set of test cases for a particular system 
under test, the analysis consists in injecting errors in 
the program to create mutant versions. All the test 
cases are then executed again each mutant and a 
mutation score is computed as the rate of mutants that 
are detected by one test case at least. An important 
assumption for this analysis is that the errors that are 
injected are relevant of most types of faults can occur. 
The different faults are modeled as mutation operators 
and systematically injected in the whole program when 
performing the experiment. 
In recent works, mutation analysis has been applied 
to security policies testing  [2, 3]. The main idea is to 
inject flaws into the security policy to get a set of 
mutant policies. Then, the efficiency of the security 
tests is evaluated by the rate of mutants that can reveal 
the injected flaws by distinguishing between the initial 
policy and mutant. 
In this paper, we propose a generic metamodel for 
security policies formalisms. It captures the necessary 
concepts to express various rule-based security policy 
formalisms (e.g. R-BAC [4], MAC [5, 6] DAC [7] 
OrBAC [8]). This metamodel thus allows a modeler to 
design a new formalism and to model policies 
according to this formalism. Based on this generic 
definition of a security policy formalism, we express 
mutation operators that can apply to all rule-based 
formalisms. This generic definition of mutation 
operators will allow us to study mutation analysis for 
various security policy formalisms without 
implementing the same mutation operators as many 
times as there formalisms.  
To validate this approach, we have implemented the 
generic security metamodel and the mutation operators 
within the Kermeta environment. We have then 
successfully instantiated the metamodel to define the 
OrBAC and RBAC security formalisms and to model a 
security policy for a library system using these two 
formalisms. We have also been able to automatically 
mutate both policies and produce a set of faulty 
policies. It is interesting to notice that the same 
mutation operator, depending on the formalism 
(RBAC, OrBAC etc.), produces very different mutants
in terms of the simulated flaws. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the 
next section, the existing approaches applying mutation 
testing to security policies are presented with a focus 
on the mutation operators. Section 3 presents the 
background and the generic metamodel. In Section 4, 
we show some examples highlighting how the 
mutation operators were implemented. 
2 Background  
In this section, we first discuss the previous 
approaches that applied mutation analysis for security 
policies. Then, we introduce metamodelling and the 
Kermeta tool used to build our generic metamodel. 
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2.1 Mutation for security policies 
Two different works have applied mutation analysis 
to security policies. We start by presenting the work of 
Xie et al. [2] who applied mutation to XACML. Then 
we summarize our previous work [3, 9] where we 
applied mutation analysis to OrBAC policies. 
a Mutation applied to XACML 
Xie et al. [2] applied mutation to XACML testing. 
XACML is an Oasis standard XML syntax for defining 
security policies. A framework is available that 
facilitates PDP (policy decision point) implementation. 
One of the difficulties of XACML is its complexity. 
They used mutation to evaluate different structural 
coverage criteria for XMACML policies tests 
generation and selection which they proposed in a 
previous work. 
 They proposed several mutation operators. The 
majority of these operators is platform dependant and 
is related to the way XACML expresses policies and 
rules. Here are some examples of operators: 
¾ RTT: Policy Set Target True: Removes the 
target tag. The rule will be applied to all 
requests. 
¾ CPC: Changes the combining algorithms 
(these algorithms allow to decide what 
rules/policies are applied). 
¾ CRE: Changes the rule type (Deny 
becomes Allow and Allow becomes Deny). 
These operators are efficient for revealing test cases 
weaknesses. In fact, a subset of operators (like RTT) 
emulates all possible syntactic faults w.r.t XACML 
syntax. In addition, other operators (CPC and CRE for 
example) emulate semantic faults.  
The CRE which replaces permissions with 
prohibitions can be reused as a generic operator for 
security policies that have rule status (deny or accept). 
In our approach, we tried to find out the operators 
that can be reused and included in the metamodel for 
security mutation operators. The CRE operator is one 
of these operators. 
b Mutation applied to OrBAC 
In a previous work [3, 9], we applied mutation 
analysis in order to qualify test cases for OrBAC 
(Organization Based Access Control) models.  
An OrBAC security rule can be a permission, 
prohibition or obligation. A rule has 5 parameters 
(called entities):  an organization, a role, an activity, a 
view and a context.  To increase modularity for the 
definition of security rules, OrBAC enables the 
definition of hierarchies for entities. In that case, rules 
defined on high level entities are inherited by the sub-
entities. An advantage of OrBAC is that is has a  tool 
called MotOrBAC [10] that allows to define, 
administer policies and check conflicts. 
We proposed a set of mutation operators that are 
adapted to OrBAC. Here are some examples: 
¾ PPR: replaces permission with prohibition. 
¾ CRD: replaces a rule context with a 
different one. 
¾ APD: replaces a rule activity with one of 
its descendants. 
¾ ANR: adds a new rule. 
As highlighted in the previous section, some 
operators are related to the OrBAC model. For 
example APD and CRD cannot be applied to RBAC 
policies. Nevertheless, we can reuse some of the 
proposed operators and make them generic. For 
example, The ANR operator is an excellent candidate. 
2.2 Metamodelling and Kermeta 
This section summarizes the intents of 
metamodelling and how the Kermeta environment fits 
in this modelling activity. 
a Metamodelling 
Metamodelling [12, 13] consists in building a 
metamodel that defines a modeling language for a 
particular domain. The metamodel defines the concepts 
and relationships that describe the domain. A 
metamodel is a model itself that is expressed with a 
modeling language called the meta-metamodel. In the 
MDA context, the OMG has defined the MOF meta-
metamodel [14] to define the basic structure of the 
metamodel. The OCL [15] can also be used to add 
constraints about the static semantics of the 
metamodel. These constraints define structural well-
formedness rules that must be satisfied by any model 
that instantiates the metamodel. However, MOF and 
OCL are not designed for specifying the dynamic 
semantics of the language. 
Concerning the dynamic semantics description of a 
metamodel, there is no standard language today. The 
Kermeta environment has been designed towards this 
purpose: it is an extension of MOF that allows defining 
operations in metamodels which instances are 
executable. Thus, using this metamodelling 
environment, it is possible to define metamodels which 
completely define a language for a particular domain. 
We have used this approach for implementing a 
requirement modeling language (presented in Section 
4). 
b Kermeta 
Kermeta [11] is an open source metamodelling 
environment developed by the Triskell team at IRISA
that is fully integrated with Eclipse. It has been 
designed as an extension to the meta-data language 
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EMOF [14] with an action language that allows 
specifying semantics and behavior of metamodels. The 
action language is imperative and object-oriented and 
is used to provide an implementation of operations 
defined in metamodels. A more detailed description of 
the language is presented in [16].  
The Kermeta action language has been specially 
designed to process models. It includes both OO 
features and model specific features. Convenient 
constructions of the Object Constraint Language 
(OCL) such as closures (e.g. each, collect, select) are 
also available in Kermeta. The action language offered 
by Kermeta is well adapted to model-oriented activities 
such as:  
¾ Specification of abstract syntax, static 
semantic (OCL) and dynamic semantics. 
¾ model and metamodel simulation and 
prototyping 
¾ model transformation 
¾ aspect weaving 
3 A generic framework for security 
policies 
In the literature, several security formalisms such as 
RBAC or OrBAC are based on the definition of 
security rules. Depending on the formalism, the type of 
rules and the entity they manipulate are different. The 
idea of the framework proposed in this section is to 
support the definition of security policies from these 
various formalisms in order to allow for the 
implementation of generic tools to manipulate the 
security models. In order to support this idea, the 
framework must thus allow defining all the different 
formalisms, and expressing models using those 
formalisms. 
The framework is built around a metamodel which 
allows representing both particular rule-based security 
formalism (such as RBAC or OrBAC) and instances of 
this formalism that model actual security policies. The 
metamodel was defined using the Eclipse Modelling 
Framework and implemented within the Kermeta 
environment. 
3.1 Generic security metamodel 
Figure 1 presents the generic security metamodel. 
On the diagram all classes include a name attribute. In 
the implementation this attribute is factorized in a 
common super-class NamedElement. 
The metamodel is divided in two parts: the three top 
classes (PolicyType, ElementType and RuleType) are 
the general concepts that allow defining any rule-based 
security policy formalism. The class PolicyType is the 
root class for the definition of security formalism. 
Security formalism consists of a set of element types 
(ElementType) and a set of rule types (RuleType). Each 
rule type has a set of parameters which are typed by 
element types. In the following we present how these 
three classes can be instantiated to represent RBAC 
and OrBAC formalisms. 
Figure 1 – The meta-model for rule-based 
security formalisms 
The three bottom classes (Policy, Rule and Element) 
on the diagram in Figure 1 allow defining actual 
security policies using a formalism defined with the 
three top classes. The class Policy is the root class to 
instantiate in order to create a security policy. Each 
policy must have a type (which is an instance of class 
PolicyType discussed in the previous paragraph) and 
contains elements and rules. The type of a policy 
constrains the types of elements and rules it can 
contain. Each element has a type which must belong to 
the element types of the policy type. If the hierarchy
property of the element type is true, then the element 
can contain children of the same type as itself. This is 
used for example to define hierarchies of roles in 
OrBAC. Finally, rules can be defined by instantiating 
the Rule class. Each rule has a type which should again 
belong to the policy type. Each rule has a set of 
parameters which types should match the types of the 
parameters of the type of the rule. 
In practice the metamodel was defined as an Ecore 
model in the EMF framework. The advantages of using 
EMF are:  
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 It generates editors that can be directly 
used to define security types and policies. 
 It integrates smoothly in the Kermeta 
environment which is used to implement 
the mutation tool. 
3.2 Definition of types of security policies 
Figure 2 shows how the metamodel was instantiated 
to model OrBAC security policies. This figure is a 
snapshot of the model editor generated by EMF from 
the metamodel presented in the previous section. In 
OrBAC there are five types of entities: organizations, 
roles, activities, views and contexts. All these types 
were defined by instances of the ElementType class.
Among these types of element, only Roles can be 
organized hierarchically. 
OrBAC defines three types of rules: permission, 
prohibition and obligation. All three types of rule have 
the same five parameters: an organisation, a role, an 
activity, a view and a context. 
Figure 2 – OrBAC model 
Figure 3 – RBAC model 
Figure 3 presents the RBAC model. In the same way 
as for the OrBAC model, the PolicyType class is 
instantiated to model RBAC. RBAC defines four types 
of entities: users, permissions, roles and constraints. 
RBAC associates users with roles on one hand and 
roles with permissions on the other hand. Two types of 
rules have to be defined: 
 UserRole rules which have two parameters: 
a user and a role. 
 RolePermission rules which have three 
parameters: a role, a permission and a 
constraint. 
The examples of OrBAC and RBAC show how 
these two existing rule based security mechanisms can 
be modelled within the proposed framework. The next 
subsection shows an example of how actual policies 
can be modelled based on the definitions of these 
formalisms.  
3.3 Definition of actual security policies 
Figure 4 – OrBAC security policy for a library 
application 
To illustrate the paper, we use the example of a 
library management system. Basically, the library 
system has various types of users: students, secretaries 
and a director. The students can borrow books from the 
library, the secretary manages the accounts of the 
students but only the director can create accounts. In 
the paper we only use a simplified version of the 
application with just a few security rules. 
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In order to validate the proposed metamodel, we 
have modelled equivalent security policies for the 
application using both OrBAC and RBAC. Figure 4 
shows a snapshot of the OrBAC policy in the editor 
generated by EMF. The model defines: 
 One organization : Library 
 Four roles: Student, Personnel, Secretary 
and Director. Among these, the roles 
Secretary and Director are in fact sub-roles 
of Personnel.  
 Three activities: Borrow, ModifyAccount 
and CreateAccount.  
 Two views: Book and UserAccount.  
 Two contexts: WorkingDays and 
Holidays. 
To illustrate the paper we have modelled five 
security rules (R1 to R5) for the library:  
  POLICY LibraryOrBAC (OrBAC) 
  R1 -> Permission(Library Student Borrow Book  
  WorkingDays) 
  R2 -> Prohibition( Library Student Borrow Book Holidays ) 
  R3 -> Prohibition( Library Secretary Borrow Book Default ) 
  R4 -> Permission( Library Personnel ModifyAccount  
  UserAccount WorkingDays ) 
  R5 -> Permission( Library Director CreateAccount 
  UserAccount WorkingDays ) 
Figure 5 – RBAC security policy for a library 
application 
A similar security policy was modeled based on 
RBAC. Figure 5 presents a snapshot of this model. It 
includes: 
 Three users: alice, yves and romain. 
 The same four roles as the OrBAC model. 
 Three permissions: BorrowBook, 
ModifyUserAccount and CreateUserAccount. 
 Two constraints: WorkingDays and Holidays. 
Six rules were defined to associate users with roles 
on one hand and associate permissions with roles on 
the other hand:  
  POLICY LibraryRBAC (RBAC) 
  R1 -> UserRole( romain Student ) 
  R2 -> UserRole( yves Director ) 
  R3 -> UserRole( alice Secretary ) 
  R4 -> RolePermission( Student BorrowBook WorkingDays ) 
  R5 -> RolePermission( Personnel ModifyUserAccount  
  WorkingDays ) 
  R6 -> RolePermission( Director CreateAccount AllTime ) 
The next section reuses these examples to show how 
the generic mutation operators we propose can apply 
on both OrBAC and RBAC security policies.  
4 The mutation operators and their 
implementation 
This section proposes mutation operators defined on 
the generic metamodel proposed in the previous 
section. Section 4.1 presents the specifications of the 
operators, Section 4.2 details their implementation 
within the Kermeta environment and Section 4.3 shows 
how they can be applied to the library example. 
4.1 Mutation operators 
We propose four mutation operators. Each operator 
inherits from the SPMutator class and implements the 
mutate method which returns a set of mutants. The 
SPMutator class is related to the SecurityPolicy class 
from the generic security framework. This association 
allows the operator classes to manipulate the security 
models. 
Figure 6. The mutation operator classes 
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The following table shows the details about each 
operator. 
Table 1- The mutation operators 
Operator Name Definition 
RTT Rule type is replaced with another one 
PPR 
Replaces one rule 
parameter with a 
different one 
ANR Adds a new rule 
RER Removes an existing rule 
PPD 
Replaces a parameter 
with one of its 
descending parameters 
It is worth noting that these operators are defined at 
the generic level independently from any security 
formalism (it can be based on RBAC, OrBAC or 
anything else).  In fact, these operators are defined 
based only the metamodel classes: 
RTT: Finds a first rule type that has the same 
parameter as the type of another rule type. Then it 
replaces the rule parameter of one rule having the first 
rule type with the other rule type. 
PPR: Chooses one rule from the set of the rules, and 
then replaces one parameter with a different parameter. 
It uses the knowledge provided by the metamodel (by 
ruleType and parameterType classes) about how rules 
are constructed. 
ANR: Uses the knowledge about the defined 
parameters and the way rules are built. Then it adds a 
new rule that is not specified. 
RER: Chooses one rule and removes it. 
PPD: Chooses one rule that contains a parameter that 
has descendant parameters (based on the parameters 
hierarchies that is defined) then replaces it with one of 
the descendants. The consequence here is that the 
derived rules will be deleted and only the rule with the 
descendant parameter remains. 
4.2 Implementation in Kermeta 
Figure 7 shows the Kermeta code for the RER 
operator. The operator iterates on the set of rules and 
picks a rule to produce a mutant policy. 
The Kermeta syntax and the use of metamodel 
allowed us to easily write the code for mutation 
operators that manipulate complex data structures such 
as security policy models. This is the case for the PPR 
operator shown in 8. 
Figure 7 – The RER operator 
Figure 8 – The PPR operator 
The PPR operator replaces rule parameters. It takes 
into account the type of parameter and produces all 
possible mutants by replacing on rule parameter with 
all possible parameters.  
4.3 Examples 
We show here some examples of mutants obtained 
for both an OrBAC and RBAC policy: 
The original OrBAC policy: 
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  POLICY LibraryOrBAC (OrBAC) 
  R1 -> Permission(Library Student Borrow Book  
  WorkingDays) 
  R2 -> Prohibition( Library Student Borrow Book Holidays ) 
  R3 -> Prohibition( Library Secretary Borrow Book Default ) 
  R4 -> Permission( Library Personnel ModifyAccount  
  UserAccount WorkingDays ) 
  R5 -> Permission( Library Director CreateAccount 
  UserAccount WorkingDays ) 
Examples of mutants: 
RER Mutant  
POLICY LibraryOrBAC-RER-R1 (OrBAC) 
  R2 -> Prohibition( Library Student Borrow Book Holidays ) 
  R3 -> Prohibition( Library Secretary Borrow Book Default ) 
  R4 -> Permission( Library Personnel ModifyAccount  
  UserAccount WorkingDays ) 
  R5 -> Permission( Library Director CreateAccount 
  UserAccount WorkingDays ) 
RTT mutant 
  POLICY LibraryOrBAC-RTS-R4-Prohibition (OrBAC) 
  R1 -> Permission( Library Student Borrow Book  
  WorkingDays ) 
  R2 -> Prohibition( Library Student Borrow Book Holidays ) 
  R3 -> Prohibition( Library Secretary Borrow Book Default ) 
  R4 -> Prohibition( Library Personnel ModifyAccount  
  UserAccount WorkingDays ) 
  R5 -> Permission( Library Director CreateAccount 
  UserAccount WorkingDays ) 
Next, we present some examples of mutants related 
to an RBAC policy. The initial RBAC policy is 
presented bellow: 
  POLICY LibraryRBAC (RBAC) 
  R1 -> UserRole( romain Student ) 
  R2 -> UserRole( yves Director ) 
  R3 -> UserRole( alice Secretary ) 
  R4 -> RolePermission( Student BorrowBook WorkingDays ) 
  R5 -> RolePermission( Personnel ModifyUserAccount  
  WorkingDays ) 
  R6 -> RolePermission( Director CreateAccount AllTime ) 
Here are some examples of the generated mutants 
RER mutant:  
POLICY LibraryRBAC-RER-R5 (RBAC) 
  R1 -> UserRole( romain Student ) 
  R2 -> UserRole( yves Director ) 
  R3 -> UserRole( alice Secretary ) 
  R4 -> RolePermission( Student BorrowBook WorkingDays ) 
  R6 -> RolePermission( Director CreateAccount AllTime ) 
PPR mutant: 
POLICY LibraryRBAC-RDD-R1-Student-Personnel (RBAC) 
  R1 -> UserRole( romain Personnel ) 
  R2 -> UserRole( yves Director ) 
  R3 -> UserRole( alice Secretary ) 
  R4 -> RolePermission( Student BorrowBook WorkingDays ) 
  R5 -> RolePermission( Personnel ModifyUserAccount
  WorkingDays ) 
  R6 -> RolePermission( Director CreateAccount AllTime )
It is important to notice that the impact of the 
mutation operator depends on the access control 
formalism used to define a policy. The errors that are 
simulated are very different as shown in the examples. 
The same operators emulate very different flaws in the 
policies. For instance, the ANR operator applied to 
RBAC simulate the adding a new permission, while for 
OrBAC it will simulate adding a new prohibition or a 
new permission. In addition, the RER operator 
simulates adding a new prohibition when used for an 
RBAC policy, but may lead to removing a permission 
when used with an OrBAC policy. The impact of the 
operator depends on the semantic and the logic of the 
access control model. 
5 Conclusion and further work 
We presented a new approach that uses a generic 
metamodel for security policy mutation. This 
metamodel captures the concepts that are necessary to 
model different rule-based security formalisms. Based 
on this metamodel, we have modelled generic mutation 
operators. These operators can be applied to simulate 
flaws in security models expressed in the various rule-
based formalisms defined with our metamodel.  
We studied the feasibility of this generic approach 
by providing an implementation of the metamodel and 
the mutation operators within the Kermeta 
environment. The tool allowed us to define the OrBAC 
and RBAC security formalisms, to model security 
policies with these formalisms and to mutate these 
models by running the generic operators.  
There are two main tracks for future work. The first 
one, that directly follows this initial study, consists in 
validating the mutation operators on other formalisms. 
In particular, we will focus on applying our approach 
to produce XACML mutants and analyse the difference 
with the mutants generated with dedicated operators. 
The XACML syntax can be integrated and expressed 
using our metamodel. 
We will also study other access control models (like 
MAC and DAC) and check whether we can define 
them using our metamodel. 
The second track for further work is to leverage the 
generic framework for security formalisms definition. 
It is now possible to experiment and develop other 
tools in addition to the mutation tool. For example, the 
framework eases experiments about the translation 
from one security formalism to another.  
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